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Parenting in the Face of Prejudice:
The Need for Representation for
Parents with Mental Illness
By Colby Brunt and Leigh Goodmark
Imagine that you have just become a par-
ent for the first time--one of the happiest
events of your life. You learn to feed,
comfort, protect, and care for your baby
through trial and error; you make mis-
takes along the way but generally give
your child excellent care. When you feel
overwhelmed-as every new parent
does-you turn to family, friends, and
other systems for support and assistance.
However, despite everything that you are
doing for your child, representatives from
a child protection agency come to inves-
tigate your home. Why? Because you,
unlike a majority of parents, have a his-
tory of mental illness. And, in the eyes of
some child protection agencies, that his-
tory, in and of itself, is sufficient reason to
believe that your child is at risk of child
abuse or neglect.
The stress of the child protection
agency's intervention causes you to
relapse, and your child is removed from
your care. The longer you are away from
your child, the worse your mental health
becomes-and the less likely you are to
have your child returned to you.
This is the crisis that many mentally
ill parents face. Misconceptions and mis-
givings about the ability to parent while
dealing with mental illness abound. State
agencies and courts frequently intervene
on behalf of the children of mentally ill
parents not because the parent has
harmed the child but because they believe
that mentally ill individuals cannot be ade-
quate parents. Stereotypes and assump-
tions about mentally ill parents predis-
pose child welfare agencies and courts to
believe that removal of a child is neces-
sary even before the parent ever has the
opportunity to care for the child. Mentally
ill parents face similar problems in fami-
ly court when custody evaluators, guard-
ians ad litem, and judges refuse to believe
that granting custody or visitation to a par-
ent with mental illness can be in a child's
best interest.
Parenting is wonderful, fulfilling, and
joyful-and heartbreaking, demanding,
and stressful. The stress of parenting is
magnified for parents with mental illness-
es. As Employment Options Inc., an orga-
nization working with mentally ill parents,
reminds its clients, "Being a parent
requires 100% focus and energy. Being a
parent with mental illness requires even
more."1 Although mental illness can ren-
der some individuals unfit to parent, the
vast majority of mentally ill parents simply
need access to services and supports that
can help them parent effectively.
One important, often overlooked, ser-
vice is legal assistance. Mentally ill par-
ents need to understand their rights in the
child welfare and family court systems.
1 EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS INC., FAMILY PROJECT-SUPPORTED PARENTING 1 (n.d.).
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Too often, mentally ill parents are con-
vinced-by social workers, child protec-
tion agency workers, other professionals
working with the family, and even friends
and family members-to relinquish cus-
tody of their children without under-
standing the implications of that decision
and without the benefit of impartial legal
advice. Losing their children, or fighting to
keep them without legal assistance, infor-
mation, or support, can cause so much
stress for mentally ill parents that other-
wise high-functioning individuals relapse.
Legal aid lawyers can work with men-
tally ill individuals to ensure that they
receive the necessary services and sup-
ports and to prevent child protective ser-
vice agencies and dependency courts
from intervening unnecessarily in their
families. Legal aid lawyers also can work
with mentally ill parents to ensure that
they retain custody of or visitation with
their children. In this article we highlight
the special issues posed for parents with
mental illness when they interact with the
child welfare or family court systems and
discuss specific strategies for attorneys to
help mentally ill parents with issues of
child protection, termination of parental
rights, custody, visitation, and the patient-
psychotherapist privilege. We also profile
a model program that provides legal and
psychosocial services in order to assist
mentally ill parents gain and maintain con-
tact with their children.
I. The Child Welfare System
States have a statutory obligation to pro-
tect children from child abuse and
neglect. The child welfare system is the
states' mechanism for performing this
function. Intervention by the child welfare
system can be broken roughly into two
phases: child protection agency investi-
gations, which occur before any court
action, and dependency court interven-
tions. We discuss below the special hur-
dles that each phase poses for parents
with mental illness.
A. Investigations by the Child
Protection Agency
Every state and the District of
Columbia require reporting of child abuse
and neglect.2 In some states only specified
professionals are required to report; in
others every citizen is a mandatory
reporter of child abuse and neglect.3 Any
individual can choose to report.' While
state definitions of child abuse and neglect
vary, federal law establishes minimum
standards for defining child abuse and
neglect. The federal definition includes
any recent act or failure to act by a par-
ent that results in death, serious physical
or emotional harm, or imminent risk of
serious harm.5 States generally define
child abuse as harm or threatened harm
to a child's health or welfare; they usual-
ly define neglect as failure to provide ade-
quate food, clothing, shelter, or medical
care (although several states exempt par-
ents who are unable to provide because
of poverty). 6
Mentally ill parents come to the atten-
tion of child abuse and neglect reporters
in a variety of ways. Obstetricians and
maternity ward staff may have concerns-
founded or unfounded-about the men-
tally ill new mother's ability to parent even
before she leaves the hospital. Other pro-
fessionals working with the mentally ill
parent may feel compelled to report based
on their interactions with the parent. For
2 NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., US. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HIMAN
SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTES ELEMENTS: REPORTING LAWS: NUiBFR 2:
MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (current through Dec. 31, 2000).
www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/statsOl/mandrep.cfm.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(2) (2001).
6 NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HiUIMAN
SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTES ELEMENTS: REPORTING LAWS: NIIMIIER 1:
DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1-2 (current through Dec. 31, 2001).
www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/statsOl/define.pdf.
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example, teachers, day care providers,
pediatricians, and social workers involved
with the parent or child may report. In
many cases, estranged noncustodial par-
ents report their former partners to child
protection agencies-both out of genuine
concern for the child and out of vindic-
tiveness or anger at the custodial parent.
After the child protection agency
receives a report and determines that it
must investigate that report (i.e., that the
behavior alleged could constitute child
abuse or neglect), the agency generally
sends a child protection agency worker
to the home to examine the child and
meet with the custodial parent.7 If the
worker has sufficient reason to believe
that the allegations of abuse or neglect
are true, the report is deemed "substanti-
ated," "indicated," or "founded."8 The
standards for substantiating reports vary
but are much closer to "more likely than
not" than "beyond a reasonable doubt."9
If the report is substantiated, the state
enters that finding in its child abuse and
neglect registry even if the case never
goes to court. 10 Substantiation can have
serious ramifications for a parent. For
example, an entry in the state's registry
can render the parent ineligible for work
with children (e.g., as a day care provider
or educator). 11
After a case is substantiated, the child
welfare agency may take one of three
actions: close the case without providing
services, open a case for services without
referring the case to court, or ask the court
to intervene. 12 The agency also must
decide whether the child can remain safe-
ly at home or whether the agency ought
to place the child in out-of-home care. 13
There is little information on how
many children enter the child welfare sys-
tem as a result of a parent's mental ill-
ness. However, some data indicate that
40 percent to 75 percent of mentally ill
women lose custody of one or more of
their children and that mentally ill women
7 JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION: How TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE ANDNEGLECT 97 (1998). A number of states are now experimenting with "differential
response" programs. In these states, reports of child abuse or neglect are placed on
either a traditional investigation or family assessment track. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. § 8-816 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 902, 906 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 210.145 (West 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248-2:1 (Michie 2001). If the family isassessed rather than investigated, the family is offered voluntary services, and no formalfinding of abuse or neglect is made. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 902 (2001); VA.CODE ANN. § 63.1-248-5:1 (Michie 2001). This process encourages families who may oth-
erwise be reluctant to accept help to participate in services that can prevent the need for
a formal child protection intervention. Inst. of Applied Research, Missouri ChildProtection Services Family Assessment and Response Demonstration: Impact Evaluation:Digest of Findings and Conclusions 35 (1998). For a mentally ill parent, such services
may include respite care, mental health services, or parenting classes. For an in-depth
examination of differential response programs, see LEIGH GOODMARK, PROMOTING
COMMUNITY CHILD PROTECTION: A LEGISLATIVE AGENDA (2002).8 WALDFOGEL, supra note 7, at 68.
9 Kate Hollenbeck, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Child Abuse Registries at theIntersection of Child Protection, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 11 TEx. J. WOMEN &L. 1, 14-15 (2001). In some states the standard is as low as "any credible evidence" of
child abuse or neglect. Id.
101d. at 17.
1 1d.
12 Id. at 16.
13 Id. Nationally about 60 percent of reports made to child protective services are deemed
inappropriate for investigation or unsubstantiated; about 40 percent are substantiated. Ofthat 40 percent, children are removed from their homes in about 5 percent of the cases.In the other 35 percent, the child stays at home "usually under the supervision of CPS[child protective services] or another agency for a period of time but in some cases with
no services or oversight at all." Jane Waldfogel, Protecting Children in the 21st Centuy,
34 FAM. L.Q. 311, 312 (2000).
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are more likely to lose custody than moth-
ers who are mentally healthy.14 Mothers
lose custody in large part because "child
welfare workers and mental health
providers are inadequately prepared to
understand issues faced by mentally ill
mothers . . ."15 Mental health profes-
sionals fail to address the parenting role
in treatment; child welfare workers
assume that mentally ill parents cannot
care for children in their homes when
usually all that the parent needs to be suc-
cessful is proper support.16 What these
professionals often miss is the positive
impact that parenting can have on an indi-
vidual's mental illness. For example,
"[b]eing a parent may serve as the moth-
er's motivation to actively participate in a
treatment plan. . . [Clhildren can be their
mother's reason for staying away from
destructive activities .. ,17
How can an attorney help a mental-
ly ill parent as the child welfare agency
decides what action to take? Attorneys
can educate parents about their rights in
the child welfare system and shield them
from pressure by the child welfare
agency, mental health professionals, and
others to relinquish custody of their chil-
dren. The intent of these individuals is
not always malign; often they simply are
concerned that the parent will be too
overwhelmed by mental illness to parent
effectively. However, even when these
professionals mean well, too often they
convince mentally ill parents to give up
their children without the parents fully
understanding their rights or receiving
the kinds of services that could help them
keep custody of their children. 18
Federal law requires child welfare
agencies to make "reasonable efforts" to
keep the child and parent together before
the child is removed from the home.1'9
Attorneys can help ensure that the agency
makes such efforts on behalf of the men-
tally ill parent and child rather than letting
the agency simply assume that, because
of the parent's condition, supports and
services cannot prevent removal. Attorneys
should take every opportunity to educate
the child welfare agency about the
strengths of parents with mental illness
and the services available to support them
and to debunk the myths about mental ill-
ness that color the agency's decisions.
Before the agency officially intervenes,
attorneys can begin to advocate on the
mentally ill parent's behalf by persuading
the agency that it should close a case
when the parent has supports and services
in place. Attorneys also can work with the
agency in an open case to develop a ser-
vice plan that will help keep the parent
and child safe and together. At this point,
for the reasons we discuss in the next sec-
tion, the attorney's goal should be to pre-
empt dependency court intervention by
creating a strong network of supports and
services for the parent and child.
B. Intervention by the
Dependency Court
Both federal and state laws pose chal-
14 Sharon G. Elstein, MaternalMental Illness in the Child Welfare Systeui, 19 CHILI) L. lioc.
33 (2000) (citing studies); see also infra note 89 and accompanying text. Very little
research is available on statistics regarding fathers with mental illness and their ahility to
retain custody of their children. For more information on fathers with mental illness in
the mental health system, see Joanne Nicholson et al., Fathers with Severe .ental Illness:
Characteristics and Comparisons, 69 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 134 (1999); Thomas H.
Styron et al., Fathers with Serious Mental Illness: A Neglected Group, 25 I',SCHIATRIC
REHABILITATION J. 215 (2002).
15 Elstein, supra note 14, at 38.
16 1d.
17 Id, However, being a parent also can prompt a mother to act in ways that are detrimen-
tal to her treatment (and ultimately, her children)-e.g., failing to take her medication in
order to stay alert to care for her children. Id.
18 See LEIGH GOODMARK, KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE SYSTEM: CREATIVE LEGAL PRACTICE AS A
COMMUNITY CHILD PROTECTION STRATEGY 42 (2001) (telephone interview with Gina
Yarbrough, staff attorney, Clubhouse Family Legal Support Project); see also Elstein,
supra note 14, at 38.
19 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2001).
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lenges for mentally ill parents who be-
come involved with the dependency sys-
tem.20 The federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act generally governs depen-
dency court proceedings. 21 Intended to
end "foster care drift," a situation in which
children bounce between foster homes
for years while courts and child protection
agencies give their parents numerous
opportunities to reunify with their chil-
dren, the Act imposes strict time lines for
achieving permanency for children in fos-
ter care. 22 In most cases, if the child has
been in out-of-home care for fifteen of
twenty-two months, the Act requires the
child welfare agency to attempt to termi-
nate the parents' rights. 23 In some cases,
where the parent's current or past behav-
ior has been sufficiently egregious, the
Act does not require the child welfare
agency to make reasonable efforts to
reunify the parent and child.24
These requirements can be especial-
ly onerous for mentally ill parents. Judges
may view mental illness as lifelong and
intractable-and therefore not amenable
to resolution in a fifteen-month period.
Given the Adoption and Safe Families
Act's primary focus on child safety, judges
may be unwilling to risk that a mentally
ill parent can keep the child safe even if
the parent has complied with treatment
and shown an ability to care for the child
while under the court's jurisdiction.
Within this context, after a depen-
dency case is filed, the court must make
several decisions in a fairly short time.
The court must make or revisit decisions
about removal and placement in out-of-
home care. Should the child be removed?
If the child has been removed, was that
action appropriate? Did the child welfare
agency initially make reasonable efforts
to prevent the child's removal? Where
should the child be placed-with the par-
ent, a relative, a foster parent, or in a
group home setting? What visitation, if
any, should the parent have?25
Later the court must decide whether
the agency has proven that the child was
abused, neglected, or both, and, if so,
what the permanency plan for the child
should be.26 If the plan calls for reunifi-
cation of the parent and child, the court
will monitor the parent's compliance with
the service plan that the agency devel-
20 The term "dependency system" refers generally to the agencies and courts that intervene
in families to protect children. This system includes investigation of child abuse and
neglect, provision of services to families, determination as to whether a child has been
abused or neglected, and a court's assertion of jurisdiction over the parents and children
involved in the abuse and neglect. After a dependency court asserts jurisdiction, children
may be removed from and reunified with parents, children may be deemed abused or
neglected, and parents' rights to the children may be terminated, freeing the children for
adoption or other permanent placement options. See Susan Vivian Mangold,
Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public Family Law: The Importance of
Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1438-41 (1999).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-679b (2001).
22 H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, pt. I (B), at 2740 (1997) (noting that children were languishing in
foster care or returned home inappropriately to return later to foster care); Katherine A.
Hort, Note, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child? ASFA's
Guidelines for the Termination of Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879, 1880-81
(2001) (citing Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (E.D. La. 1991) (Clearinghouse
No. 41,204)) (defining "foster care drift" and noting the ASFA's strict time lines).
23 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2001). Some states have instituted even shorter time lines. See,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(B)(1)(d) (West 2002) (permitting termination of
parental rights after child has been in out-of-home care for twelve of the last twenty-two
months).
24 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2001).
25 See NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING
COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 37-40 (1995), available at
www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/resguid.pdf.
26 Cecilia Fiermonte, Reasonable Efforts Under ASFA: The Judge's Role in Determining the
Permanency Plan, 20 CHILD L. PRAC. 17 (2001).
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oped to achieve that goal. 27 If the court
believes that the parent never will be fit
to care for the child, the permanency plan
may call for termination of parental rights
and adoption or another variation that
excludes the parent.28 Alternatively the
child welfare agency can engage in "con-
current planning," that is, working toward
a primary goal of reunification while
preparing for the child to be adopted
should reunification fail.29
Mentally ill parents face obstacles at
every point after a dependency case is
filed. Doubts and prejudices about par-
enting with mental illness may prompt
judges to remove children or place them
in out-of-home care despite evidence that,
with support, these parents can ade-
quately care for their children.30 Judges
sometimes assume that a child is neglect-
ed per se as a result of the parent's men-
tal illness. Judges' attitudes about mental
illness can color their perception of the
parent's progress and ability to resume
care for the child and lead them to deter-
mine that reunification is inappropriate
given the parent's condition. 31 The par-
ent's failure to comply with the require-
ments of the service plan-which may
conflict with the parent's mental health
treatment plan-also can lead to a court
finding that the parent's rights should be
terminated. 32
State law and practice vary as to
when a parent involved with the depen-
dency system is entitled to a lawyer at
state expense.33 However, that mentally ill
parents need attorneys at every stage of
a court case is clear. Attorneys can ensure
that case plans account for the parent's
mental health treatment and do not cre-
ate conflicting responsibilities for the par-
ent-for example, asking the parent to
attend parenting classes at the same time
that the parent is scheduled for sessions
with the mental health treatment provider.
Attorneys can fight to keep children in
the parent's custody (preventing the fif-
teen-month clock from beginning to tick)
and can address the court's concerns
about whether the parent has the capac-
ity and support to care for children on a
daily basis. Attorneys can ensure that par-
ents actually are receiving the services to
which they are entitled, services that will
be crucial in trying to reunify parents and
children. Attorneys can argue that the
agency has failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify children and parents and
can bring to the court's attention infor-
27 jennifer Renne, Reasonable Efforts to Finalize a Pennanency Plan for Reunification. 20
CHILD L. PRAc. 33, 38-41 (2001).
28 Fiermonte, supra note 26, at 23-27.
2945 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(4) (2001). For a discussion of the definition and history of con-
current planning, see PATRICIA SCHENE, UNIV. OF S. ME., IMPLEM.\ENTJNG CONCIIIRFNT
PLANNING: A HANDBOOK FOR CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATORS 1-5 (2001), http://muskic5.
musk. usm. maine.edu/helpkids/rcpdfs/concurrent. pdf.
30 See Elstein, supra note 14, at 33-34 (discussing a number of studies and draw\ing thu
conclusion that mentally ill mothers can successfully raise children with fimily and coni-
munity support).
31 See GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 43 (telephone interview with Gina Yarbrough, Staff
attorney, Clubhouse Family Legal Support Project).
32 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/1(D)(m) (West 2002) (establishing failure to coin-
ply with service plan requirements as grounds for termination of parental rights); In re
Brittany S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "a parent's failurc to
comply with the service plan almost invariably leads to termination of parental rights").
E.g., the service plan could call for participation in family counseling, which could he
contraindicated by the mental health treatment plan. The service plan could require tile
parent to seek employment to support the children, while the mental licalth treatment
plan could require the parent to attend counseling on weekdays. The service plan could
require the parent to attend frequent meetings with the caseworker, and this could
cause the parent to miss mental health treatment.
33 MARK HARDIN ET AL., 1 STATE COURT ASSESSMENTS 1995-1998: DEPENDENCY 1PROCEEI)ING!:
REPRESENTING CLIENTS 19 (1999).
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mation that the child welfare agency
might not be anxious to reveal.
34
The stress of litigation, especially lit-
igation that could result in losing their
children, can cause mentally ill parents to
relapse or to begin to have symptoms of
the mental illness serious enough that the
parents ultimately relapse. 35 Attorneys can
shield clients from stressful situations,
gauge the impact that the stress of litiga-
tion is having on their client's mental ill-
ness, and help the client deal with that
stress by explaining the legal process and
ensuring that the client's treatment
providers understand the demands of lit-
igation. Attorneys also can help parents
develop and implement procedures in
case of a relapse, so that if a parent does
relapse, the court and the agency know
that the child will be safe. Most parents
find the dependency system confusing,
disempowering, and difficult to negotiate
alone; for mentally ill parents, having a
representative is especially crucial.
Representation is particularly impor-
tant in cases in which the mentally ill par-
ent's rights could be terminated. Termina-
tion of parental rights has been called the
death penalty of the civil law system-it
kills biological families. 36 In many cases,
parents deserve to have their rights ter-
minated because of their chronic abuse
and neglect of their children and their
unwillingness or inability to change their
behavior. However, some mentally ill par-
ents find that courts are terminating their
rights not because of anything they have
done but because of what they might do.
In re D.L.M. is illustrative. 37 After liv-
ing with her mother for some time, D.L.M.
was removed from her mother's care as a
result of her mother's hospitalization for
mental illness. 38 Over the next several
years, the mother was hospitalized on a
few occasions; the child was placed first
with her maternal grandmother and later
with foster parents. 39 The trial court, find-
ing that the "mother suffered from an irre-
versible mental condition which, during
periods of 'decompensation,' rendered
her unable to knowingly provide D.L.M.
with necessary care, custody and control,"
terminated the mother's parental rights.
40
The court found no evidence that the
mother had abused the child.41 The court
finally found that the mother was unlike-
ly to be able to reunify with the child
within an ascertainable period of time.42
That the mother suffered from schiz-
ophrenia and that schizophrenia was a
permanent condition were undisputed.4 3
The mother also suffered from depres-
sion that stemmed primarily from the lit-
igation and her fear of losing her daugh-
ter.44 And, as the Missouri Court of
Appeals noted, the mother had a history
of calling for help when facing problems
related to her mental illness. 45 When the
34 E.g., the child welfare agency may not be anxious to reveal that the parent already has
taken the parenting class that the agency is ordering, that the parent independently has
sought counseling and other services because the agency did not arrange for the parent
to do so, that the parent is doing well in treatment, or that the parent and child have a
very strong bond-anything that might undermine the agency's claim that the parent's
rights should be terminated.
35 See GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 45 (telephone interview with Gina Yarbrough, staff
attorney, Clubhouse Family Legal Support Project).
36 See, e.g., Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the
Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 2 (1995).
37 In re D.L.M., 31 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
38 1d. at 66.
39 Id. at 66-67.
40 Id. at 67.
4 1 1d. The trial court did find that the mother sometimes had failed to give the child ade-
quate food, clothing, shelter, or other care and control, a finding that the appellate court
disputed. Id. at 70.
42 Id. at 67.
43 Id. at 69.
44 1d.
45 1d.
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mother failed to take her medication
(twice in six years) and needed inpatient
treatment as a result, the mother volun-
tarily hospitalized herself and, on at least
one occasion, took her children to stay
with their grandmother before going to
the hospital.46 Based on the mother's will-
ingness to seek help when necessary and
the absence of any evidence that the
mother had harmed or was likely to harm
the child, the appellate court reversed the
trial court's termination of the mother's
parental rights.47
The appellate court in In re D.L.M.
prevented the permanent destruction of
this mentally ill mother's tie to her daugh-
ter. Other mentally ill parents are not so
lucky. While in some of those cases the
mentally ill parent actually may be unable
to provide a safe and permanent home
for the child, in others judges may deem
the fear that the child will be harmed suf-
ficient for them to terminate parental
rights. How often this occurs is impossi-
ble to know; only a fraction of all appel-
late cases are reported, and only in appel-
late decisions can advocates see what
happens on the trial court level. Advocates
are developing new strategies to protect
the parental rights of mentally ill parents.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
seemed to hold potential for protecting
mentally ill parents in the dependency
system.48 However, that potential has not
been realized. The application of the ADA
to cases regarding termination of parental
rights is one of the most hotly contested
areas of domestic law. State appellate
courts are currently being asked to ad-
dress this issue, and, as the cases we dis-
cuss below illustrate, there is no agree-
ment among them.
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to
provide "a clear and comprehensive man-
date for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. - 9
With the ADA, Congress intended to give
people with disabilities protection under
the law and, like the Adoption and Sate
Families Act, create a baseline for state
laws. 50 Title II of the ADA is currently at
the center of the controversy over pro-
ceedings regarding termination of parental
rights. Title II provides that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by rea-
son of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to dis-
crimination by such entity -51 The
issue before many of the appellate courts
is whether the ADA can be used as a
defense to a petition for termination of
parental rights if the parent believes that
the state social services agency or state
court discriminated against the parent on
the basis of disability.
A few courts held that the ADA
applied to cases regarding termination of
parental rights or, at the very least, gave
parents some recourse if they believed an
ADA violation occurred in the provision
of services before the filing for tennination
of parental rights. For example, in In re
CM. the Texas Court of Appeals held that
the ADA was an affirmative defense to a
petition to terminate parental rights but
that it must be raised at the trial level)2 '
In Family Independence Agenc), v. Tern
,
the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
the ADA required a public agency to
make reasonable accommodations for
individuals with disabilities. 53 The court
stated that the state child welfare agency's
46 Id.
47d. at 70-71. The appellate court stated that parental mental illness, per se, is not harm-
ful to a child. Id. at 69 (citing In re C.P.B., 641 S.W3d 456, 460 (Mo. 1982)). The appel-
late court also noted that the mother had repeatedly made efforts to regain Custody.
complied with service plans, and had a strong bond with her daughter. Id at 71.
48 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1990).
49 /d. § 12101(b)(1).
50 1d. § 12201(b); 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(b) (2001).
5142 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990).
52 In re C.M., 996 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App. 1999).
53 Family Independence Agency v. Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
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reunification services and programs "must
comply with the ADA."54 Similarly, in
Stone v. Daviess County Division of
Children and Family Services, the Indiana
Court of Appeals held that once an
"agency opts to provide services ... the
provision of those services must be in
compliance with the ADA.'
55
Other states reached different con-
clusions regarding the application of the
ADA to termination of parental rights.
Many of these cases held that the ADA
did not apply to these actions because
termination proceedings did not qualify
as a service, program, or activity under
the ADA. 56 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court adopted this reasoning in
Adoption of Gregory.57 Although the court
ruled that the ADA did not apply to ter-
mination proceedings, it noted that the
ADA and Massachusetts law required the
state to accommodate parents with special
needs in its provision of services before a
termination proceeding. 58
The court in Adoption of Gregory
believed that to apply the ADA to pro-
ceedings regarding termination of parental
rights would subordinate the rights of the
child to those of the parents.59 Similarly,
inJ. T v. Arkansas Department of Human
Services, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that the parents' rights under the ADA
must be subordinated to the child's inter-
ests because the focus of all termination
proceedings was the "best interests of the
child. ''6° Other states followed this rea-
soning, holding that the interest of the
child was paramount and that elevating
the parents' interests was an abuse of dis-
cretion by the trial judge.6 1 Arguably these
rulings directly conflicted with the U.S.
Supreme Court holding in Santosky v.
Kramer that a parent and child were pre-
sumed to share an interest in staying
together until the parent was deemed
"unfit."62 The cases also potentially con-
tradicted Stanley v. Illinois, in which the
Supreme Court held that the fundamental
right to raise one's children was constitu-
tionally protected.63
The state courts are clearly divided
as to how the ADA should apply to ter-
Judges must determine the best interests of the
child; mental illness may be a factor in this
decision, but it is not determinative.
mination proceedings. The Supreme Court
likely will be asked to address this issue.
Attorneys practicing in this area need to
be acutely aware of this issue and raise at
the trial court level any objections based
on ADA violations.
II. The Family Court System
Unlike dependency cases, custody and
visitation cases typically involve biologi-
cal parents seeking custody of or visitation
rights with (or both) the minor children.
These cases can be extremely upsetting
for parents with mental illness because,
54 Id. For two cases holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act applied to reunifica-
tion services that the state agency offered, see In re John D., 934 P.2d 308, 313-14 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1997); In re Anthony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
55 Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995) (Clearinghouse No. 50,998).
56 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990); see, e.g., In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1994); In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997).
57 Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Mass. 2001).
58 Id. at 126.
59 Id. at 125.
60J.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 947 S.W.2d 761, 768 (Ark. 1997).
61 See, e.g., In re T.B., 2000 Colo. App. LEXIS 1637, at *5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); In re
Anthony P., 2000 Cal. App. LEXIS 875, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); In re Chance Jahmel
B., 723 N.Y.S.2d 634, 640 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001).
62 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982).
63 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (Clearinghouse No. 3262).
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unlike in dependency cases, the opposing
party is someone with whom they have
shared a relationship. However, as in
dependency cases, there appears to be
an overriding presumption that parents
with mental illnesses cannot adequately
care for their children; these parents fre-
quently lose custody of or contact with
their children.64 The following cases illus-
trate this issue.
A. Custody Determinations
Since the 1970s, the predominant stan-
dard for determining custody has been the
"best interests of the child. ' 65 Judges must
grant custody to the party most likely to
foster the child's best interests. 66 The "best
interests of the child" standard is com-
pletely subjective; trial courts receive little
guidance on making these decisions from
either state statutes or case law.67 The
looseness of the standard permits judges
to weigh mental illness more heavily than
other factors. The stigma associated with
mental illness may color judges' percep-
tions of the parent's ability to further the
child's best interests. As a result, parents
with mental illness often must prove first
that they are fit parents before arguing that
granting the parents custody is in the chil-
dren's best interests.
Every case and jurisdiction vary in the
handling of cases involving parents with
mental illnesses. Often, however, lower-
court judges award custody to the parent
without the mental illness on the basis of
the other parent's "diagnosis, hospitaliza-
tion, or treatment for mental illness. "68
Given the presumption that an appellate
court will not overturn the findings of the
trial court absent a finding of an abuse of
discretion by the trial judge, the rate of
success on appeal for a parent who is
denied custody because of mental illness
is very low. 69 The following cases illus-
trate how parents with mental illness are
treated within the family courts.
In Willey v. Willey the Iowa Supreme
Court explained how the court should
determine the best interests of the child in
cases involving parental mental illness. 7 °1
The mother in Willey suffered from a form
of chronic schizophrenia. 71 The appeal
before the court related to the mother's
desire to have custody of the parties'
minor son.72 Although the court ultimately
ruled in favor of the father, the court
understood the importance of both par-
ents being a part of the child's life. 73 It
found that mental illness alone did not
disqualify a parent from having custody.AI
The court stated that [s]light mental ill-
ness, or an arrested case in one found to
be mentally ill, will not per se disqualify
that person as a proper custodian."75
The Willey case is representative of
those difficult cases in which both par-
ents deeply care about their child but one
has an illness that sometimes can affect
that person's parenting ability. The Willey'
court recognized that a person with men-
tal illness could be the primary custodi-
an as long as the mental illness of that
parent would not jeopardize the "health,
64 See supra note 14 and accompanying text and infra note 89 and accompanying tcxt.
65 Kathryn L. Mercer, A Context Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making: HotiJudges Use the
Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 W\i. & MARY J. OF
WOMAN & L. 1, 26-27 (1998).
66 Id. at 31-32.
67JOHN DEWIrr GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY: LAW 371-72 (1993).
68 SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL I)ISAB1LITIF AND
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 20 (2001).
69 Id.
70 Willey v. Willey, 115 N.W.2d 833 (Iowa 1962).
71 Id. at 834.
721 d. at 835.
73 Id. at 838.
74 1d. at 837.
75Id.
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safety, and welfare of the child."7 6 Ul-
timately, although the court in Willey stat-
ed that no clear and convincing evidence
existed that the mother's mental illness
would jeopardize the health, safety, and
welfare of the child, the court found that
granting the father custody would be in
the child's best interest. 77
In A.H. v. WP. the Alaska Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court had not
abused its discretion by granting custody
to the mentally healthy parent.78 In this
case, the mother of the minor child suf-
fered from an "undiagnosed mental
impairment."79 The court found that her
actions indicated "a significant disturbance
in [her] overall cognitive and emotional
functioning." 80 Unlike the majority of
cases involving a mentally ill parent, the
court in this case focused not on the
party's illness but on the party's behav-
ior. The court specifically noted that the
trial court did not "rely on a social stigma
associated with A.H.'s disability. Rather,
[the trial court] specifically referred to
A.H.'s bizarre conduct and extremely
destructive actions."8 1
The court stated that "'the mental
health of a parent is a proper topic of
inquiry at a custody hearing; however, the
basis of custody determination is the best
interests of the child and a parent's con-
duct is relevant only insofar as it has or
can be expected to negatively affect the
child.' 8 2 Although the court granted cus-
tody to the parent without the illness, the
court based its conclusion on the facts that
the mother's "behavior and condition were
detrimental to the [child], and that she was
unreliable and unable to care for him."83
In some instances state statutes give
courts guidance as to what factors the
judge must consider when determining
the best interests of the child. For exam-
ple, in In re Lombaer, the Appellate Court
of Illinois reversed and remanded the trial
court's decision granting the father with-
out the mental illness custody of the
minor children because the lower court
failed to consider the statutory guide-
lines.84 Instead the trial court relied on
the father's account of the mother's men-
tal illness and her failure to take medica-
tions-without any showing of risk or
harm to the children and despite the
mother having been the children's pri-
mary caretaker.85
Illinois law requires trial courts to
consider, among other factors, the wish-
es of the child and parents; the child's
adjustment to school and home; the inter-
action of the child and the child's siblings
or other people who have a significant
relationship with the child; any domestic
violence between the parties; and the
"mental and physical health" of the par-
ties. 86 The court held that although the
trial court need not make specific find-
ings of fact as to each factor, there "must
be some indication that the court consid-
ered the various factors" in making its
final determination. 87 The court noted that
the record contained no indication that
the trial court considered the various fac-
tors and that "virtually no evidence was
adduced as to the children's best inter-
ests."88 Unlike many states, Illinois's
statute gives judges specific guidance on
how to make a proper custody determi-
nation and requires that all the factors,
76Id. at 838.
77 Id. at 837.
78 A.H. v. W.P., 896 P.2d 240, 244-45 (Alaska 1995).
79 1d. at 241.
801d. at 245.
81 /d.
82Id. at 244-45 (quoting Morel v. Morel, 647 P.2d 605, 608 (Alaska 1982).
83Id. at 245.
84 In re Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d 388, 394 (11. App. Ct. 1990).
85 Id. at 394-95.
86 Id. at 394 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 603(a) (1987)).
87 Id. at 394.
88 Id.
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2002 1 JOURNAL OF POVERTY LAW AND POLICY
Representing Mentally Ill Parents
mental health being just one, must be
taken into consideration.
Although the courts in a majority of
cases grant custody to the party without
the mental illness, one conclusion is clear
from these cases-a judge may not deter-
mine the issue of custody solely on the
basis of a parent's mental illness. Judges
must determine the best interests of the
child; mental illness may be a factor in
this decision, but it is not determinative.
When litigating custody cases, attor-
neys need to focus on three main issues.
First, attorneys need to determine which
party was the child's primary caregiver.
This means investigating which parent
performed the day-to-day tasks such as
waking the child up in the morning, cook-
ing meals for the child, putting the child
to bed at night, and taking an active role
in the child's schooling. The mentally ill
parent's previous involvement in the
child's daily life is especially important if
it shows that the parent was capable of
performing all of these tasks and that the
other parent was comfortable allowing
the mentally ill parent to do so.
Second, attorneys need to determine
what custody arrangement is in the child's
best interests. Attorneys need to make
clear to the court why residing with their
client is better for the child. The court
must understand the advantages that the
mentally ill parent can offer the child that
the other party cannot and why the child
would be in a better position if the court
granted custody to the mentally ill par-
ent. The attorney must be clear that,
although the mental illness may act to the
child's detriment in certain situations, the
mentally ill parent has contingency plans
in place for those situations and is, on the
whole, able to meet the child's needs.
Third, knowing that the parent's men-
tal illness will be raised, attorneys must
continually focus the judge on the legal
standard for custody determinations: the
best interests of the child. Attorneys
should remind the judge that, although
the client has an illness, that illness does
not prevent the parent from being able
to provide a stable and healthy environ-
ment for the child. With every case involv-
ing mentally ill parents, attorneys should
take the opportunity to educate judges,
custody evaluators, and others about the
parenting capacity of the mentally ill and
about the services and supports available
for those parents.
B. Visitation
Studies show that as many as 70 per-
cent to 80 percent of parents with men-
tal illness lose custody of their children
to other parties.89 As a result, many par-
ents rely on sporadic visitation to keep in
contact with their children, However. for
some parents, fighting to get even spo-
radic access can be futile.
As in custody determinations. the
standard that courts use for visitation
determinations is the "best interests of the
child." Willey v. Willey outlined the gen-
eral view on a parent's rights to visita-
tion.9°) In Willey the Iowa Supreme Court
stated:
The rule is well established in all
jurisdictions that the right of
access to one's child should not
be denied unless the court is
convinced that such visitations
are detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the child. In the absence
of extraordinary circumstances a
parent should not be denied the
right of visitation. 9 1
In Smith v. Smith the Iowa Supreme
Court held that the father should not he
denied the right to visit with his children
solely on the basis of his mental illness.
-'2
The trial court had denied the father vis-
itation with the minor children because
of a long, documented history of mental
8 9 JOANNE NICHOLSON ET AL., PARENTING WELL WHEN YOU'RE DEPRESSED 167 (2001) (clIing stud-
ies); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
90 Willey, 115 N.W.2d 833, 838.
911d. at 839.
92 Smith v. Smith, 142 N.W.2d 421, 425-26 (Iowa 1966).
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illness.9 3 The appellate court held that it
was "not convinced the best interest of
the children is served by letting them
grow up under the exclusive influence of
their mother and her attitude without even
a chance to become acquainted with their
father."'94 The court further held that
"'[v]isitation or the denial thereof should
not be made to appease one parent or
punish the other. Such right of visitation
should be allowed or denied, according
to what is best for the child. Its welfare
must receive paramount consideration.' 9
5
The court also held that the lower
court's ruling was improper because the
custodial parent controlled if and when
the father could have visitation. 96 The
court stated that
the order should not make the
right of visitation contingent
upon an invitation from the party
having the custody of the child,
or require the consent of one
parent for the other to visit the
child, thereby leaving the privi-
lege of visitation entirely to the
discretion of the party having the
child in custody.97
A number of courts stated that visita-
tion must create a significant risk in order
for a judge to deny a parent visitation. For
example, in Davis v. Davis the Ohio Court
of Appeals held that "the [trial] court
should enforce the child's right of visita-
tion unless extraordinary circumstances
preclude it. '"98 The court defined "extra-
ordinary circumstances" as "[clircum-
stances which create a significant risk of
serious physical or emotional harm to the
child."99 In Davis the father appeared to
have a limited capacity for parenting; a
court-appointed psychiatrist stated that
the father should have visits but that a
trained mental health professional should
supervise such visits.100 The trial court
admitted the psychiatrist's report into evi-
dence but nonetheless determined that
the father should not have any visita-
tion.10 1 The appellate court, finding no
evidence to indicate that visitation posed
a serious danger to the child, reversed the
denial of visitation. 10
2
Other cases held that the trial courts
abused their discretion in denying or
severely limiting mentally ill parents' vis-
itation. For example, in Atbey v. Atbey the
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that
the mother should not be denied visitation
with her child even though she suffered
from a mental illness. 103 The court held
that "[allthough there was substantial tes-
timony regarding the wife's mental con-
dition, there was no evidence indicating
that she is a danger to the child or that it
is in the best interests of the child to be
denied contact with her."10 4
Similarly, in In re Lombaer, the Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois found that al-
though evidence existed as to the moth-
er's previous hospitalizations and failure
to take medications, this evidence was
"insufficient to meet the onerous standard
of serious endangerment, particularly in
light of the absence of expert testimony
that the medication was necessary to pre-
vent her from harming herself or oth-
ers. '10 5 The court held that to restrict a
parent's visitation rights the trial court
must find that "'visitation would endan-
93 Id. at 422.
94Id. at 424.
95 Id. (quoting Bedolfe v. Bedolfe, 127 Pac. 594 (Wash. 1912)).
96 Id. at 425.
97Id.
98 Davis v. Davis, 563 N.E.2d 320, 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
99 Id.
'
0
°d. at 323.
101Id.
102/d, at 324-25.
103 Athey v. Athey, 757 So. 2d 1196, 1201 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
104/Id.
105 Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d at 395.
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ger seriously the child's physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health.""'10 6
In Surrey v. Surrey the District of
Colombia Court of Appeals held that
although the mother was the "unfortunate
victim" of paranoid schizophrenia, that
alone should not prevent her from being
able to visit with her children. 10 7 The
court stated that the trial court should con-
sider the mother's mental illness but that
such an illness should not be determina-
tive on the issue of visitation. 10 8 The
appellate court noted that the trial court
primarily focused on whether the moth-
er was of sound mind and not on the
proper legal standard of whether she had
a right to visit with her children. 10 9 The
court vacated and remanded the lower
court's findings and instructed the trial
court that "the burden, if there is one, [is]
on the father to show that the mother's
exercise of her right to see the children
should be denied because it would inju-
riously affect the children."' 0
Again, as in custody cases, the law is
that the determining issue is the child's
best interests and not whether the parent
suffers from an illness. Case law indicates
that mental illness may be a factor in
determining the scope of and restrictions
on visitation, but the children's interest in
maintaining a relationship with their par-
ents must be the priority. Denying a par-
ent access to a child requires a clear
showing that visitation or contact with the
parent would seriously endanger the
health and welfare of the minor child.
Attorneys need to be aware of the
heightened standards that protect parents'
contact with their children. They need to
emphasize to the court that there must be
a clear showing of danger to the child
and that the burden is on the opposing
party to show that the court should deny
visitation. Having a treating clinician tes-
tify as to the parent's current level of func-
tioning may be beneficial for the client.
Judges tend to give this testimony great
weight, which improves the client's
chances of obtaining visitation. Attorneys
should consider requesting that the court
appoint a guardian ad litem to the case
because the guardian ad liten? can con-
duct a more thorough investigation as to
custody and visitation issues, and a com-
plete investigation into their fitness usu-
ally is beneficial for many parents with
mental illness. Ideally attorneys should
request that the court appoint a guardian
ad litem or custody evaluator with a men-
tal health or clinical background.
Attorneys representing mentally ill
parents should provide for training for
judges, custody evaluators, and guardians
ad litem to ensure that the people whom
the court appoints as guardians ad litem
and custody evaluators are trained in
working with cases involving mental ill-
ness of one of the parties. Attorneys also
should educate opposing counsel during
settlement negotiations by helping oppos-
ing counsel and the other parent see that
the mentally ill parent will not endanger
the child. Attorneys should create plans
to safeguard the child should problems
arise during visitation.
Mentally ill parents already face uphill
battles in trying to maintain contact with
their children. They should not have to
fight these battles alone. Having counsel
can mean the difference between a men-
tally ill parent being awarded appropri-
ate visitation and the destruction of the
parent-child relationship.
III. Patient-Psychotherapist Privilege
In highly contested domestic matters the
admissibility of one or both parents' psy-
chiatric records is likely to be raised. II
The statutes and case law that govern the
1061d. (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, 607(c) (1987)).
107Surrey v. Surrey, 144 A.2d 421, 422 (D.C. 1958).
10 81d. at 423.
10 91d.
1101d/.
11lFor cases discussing the admissibility of psychiatric records, see, e.g., Kinsclla v.
Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 565-84 (N.J. 1997); Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 745 A.2d 1054.
1058-73 (Md. 2000); Lombaer, 558 N.E.2d at 393-94.
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issue of patient-psychotherapist privilege
vary from state to state, but every juris-
diction has some form of the privilege.
112
Many states also have an exception to the
privilege, either through case law or
statute, for cases involving child custody,
visitation with a minor child, or both.113
In Kinsella v. Kinsella the New Jersey
Supreme Court discussed when the priv-
ilege should be waived and what the
courts can do to preserve the integrity of
the patient-psychotherapist privilege.
114
The Kinsella case involved piercing the
privilege for three reasons: a marital tort
claim, an extreme cruelty claim for
divorce, and a child custody dispute
between the parties. 115 The court denied
access to the records for use in the mar-
ital tort and extreme cruelty claims; how-
ever, in the custody claim the court
remanded the issue for further review
consistent with the opinion. 116
In determining whether the patient-
psychotherapist privilege should be
pierced, the Kinsella court first analyzed
the rationale for protecting the privilege.
The court stated that effective therapy was
based on a premise of trust and that liti-
gants who were seeking this assistance
needed reassurance that what they said
to their therapists would remain pri-
vate. 117 The court also noted the public
benefit of keeping the information privi-
leged so that individuals with a mental or
emotional illness could receive appropri-
ate treatment. 118 The court explained that
while the privilege could be waived under
some circumstances, the intrusion must
be for a legitimate need, there must be
no other way to obtain the information,
and the information sought must be rel-
evant and material. 119
In deciding whether the privilege
should be waived in a custody case and
to what extent, the court noted:
We recognize that in a child cus-
tody case the mental health of a
parent may be a relevant issue.
Where this issue is raised the
trial court must maintain a prop-
er balance, determining on the
one hand the mental health of
the parents as this relates to the
best interest of the child, and on
the other maintaining confiden-
tiality between a treating psychi-
atrist and his patient. 120
The court stated that the best alter-
native in custody cases in which one or
both parents suffered from a mental ill-
ness was to have the lower court appoint
112Kinsella, 696 A.2d at 566 (citing Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 & n.11 (1996)
(Clearinghouse No. 51,222)) (listing statutes).
113 1d. at 581.
1141d. at 566.
115Id. at 561.
1 61d. at 584.
1171d. at 566.
1181d.
1191d. at 568 (citing In re Kozlov, 398 A.2d 882, 887 (N.J. 1979)).
120 d. at 580.
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a psychiatric evaluator to determine the
fitness of the parties requesting cus-
tody.121 The court held that the court-
appointed evaluator's access to past psy-
chiatric records was an issue that must be
determined on a case-by-case basis and
that the patient's privacy should always
be taken into consideration. 122 The court
noted that allowing evaluators to have
access to all records could be detrimen-
tal to the custody process. 123 The effect of
allowing a broad disclosure of records
would be that the "threat of court-ordered
disclosure can too easily become a strate-
gic weapon for the other parent.' '124 The
court further remarked that disclosure of
treatment records could deter parents
from seeking custody or visitation with
their children because of the stigma or
embarrassment that the parents might feel
after the release of the information. 125
Although the court in Kinsella nar-
rowly drew exceptions to the privilege,
other courts allowed the privilege to be
waived just because custody was at issue.
In Owen v. Owen the Indiana Supreme
Court held that "the mental and physical
health of all parties involved become sub-
jects for consideration by the trial court"
and that the mother "placed her mental
condition in issue when she petitioned
for and was granted custody under the
original order .... 126 The court further
held that "[wihen a party-patient places a
condition in issue by way of a claim,
counterclaim, or affirmative defense, she
[or he] waives the physician-patient priv-
ilege as to all matters causally or histori-
cally related to that condition . ."127
Similarly, in Thompson v. Thompson, the
Alabama Court of Appeals held that if
either party alleged fitness of the parent
and the parent's mental state was clearly
at issue, the psychiatrist-patient privilege
was waived and that the trial court had
broad discretion in determining what
should be allowed into evidence. 128
In Clark v. Clark the Nebraska
Supreme Court allowed the privilege to
be waived but limited the scope of
access. 129 The court held that "when a lit-
igant seeks custody of a child in a disso-
lution of marriage proceeding, that action
does not result in making relevant the
information contained in the file cabinets
of every psychiatrist who has ever treated
the litigant."'13 The court added that the
determination as to admissibility of evi-
dence was entrusted to the trial court. 13 1
Like the Indiana and Alabama courts, the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that when
parental fitness was raised, waiving the
privilege was in the best interest of the
child, but it gave the trial court greater dis-
cretion to limit the information sought. 132
By contrast, in Laznzovsk , v. Laz-
novsky the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that the parent did not waive the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege when par-
ties seeking custody asserted their fit-
ness. 133 The court held that "while the
mental and physical health of a party is an
issue to be considered by the trial court,
a person seeking an award of child cus-
tody that claims to be a fit parent, does
not, without more, waive the confiden-
tial psychiatrist/psychologist-patient priv-
ilege "134
121/Id.
122/d. at 584.
123 /d.
124Md. at 582.
1251d.
126Owen v. Owen, 563 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. 1990).
127/Id.
128 Thompson v. Thompson, 624 So. 2d 619, 620 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).
129Clark v. Clark, 371 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Neb. 1985).
1301d.
131Id.
1 2 1d.
133Laznovsky, 745 A.2d at 1068.
13 4 1d. at 1073.
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In reaching this conclusion, the court
looked at the legislative background of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The
court noted that the Maryland legislature
intentionally repealed the exemption that
allowed privileged information to come
into evidence in custody cases. 135 The
court observed that the Maryland legisla-
ture was fully aware of the ramifications of
repealing the child custody exception and
that, when it did so, the legislature was
balancing the interest in the privilege with
the best interests of the child.136 In exam-
ining the legislative history of other states,
the court stated, "[W]e have found in our
research no case in which a foreign state's
legislative body has specifically balanced
the competing interests of the needs of
proper mental health and the needs for
courts to have such information in child
custody matters . ... "137 Maryland, unlike
most states, has actively limited the avail-
ability of patients' records and helped pre-
serve the original intent of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege.
Although accessing psychiatric records
is relatively easy, attorneys for mentally ill
parents should argue that the court should
limit the scope of this access. Health
records are one of the few private aspects
of mentally ill parents' lives. To disclose
the information in these records would be
extremely detrimental to the parent's con-
tinued therapeutic treatment.
The best way for an attorney to limit
the scope of access to this information, if
the records must be produced, is to
request that the court appoint a guardian
ad litem to serve as an investigator. The
guardian ad litem is then the only third
party with full access to the records.
Attorneys should request guardians ad
litem with clinical backgrounds; such
guardians are more likely to be sensitive
to the mental health issues and under-
stand the client's desire to keep the
records as confidential as possible.
Counsel also can request that a judge
other than the one sitting on the case view
the records in camera to determine to
which portions of the records the oppos-
ing party is entitled.
Attorneys for parents with mental ill-
ness are crucial at this stage in the litiga-
tion because the issue of privilege is such
a complex legal matter. Without an attor-
ney advocating to protect the client's priv-
ilege, the parent's records may inappro-
priately be given to the opposing party
and certainly will be used as a weapon
throughout the case. As we mentioned
previously, educating judges about men-
tal illness is crucial if they are to under-
stand the records in context.
IV. A Model Program Assisting
Parents with Mental Illness
Parents with mental illness face much
adversity in their quest to keep custody of
and contact with their children. One
leader in assisting parents with mental ill-
ness is the Clubhouse Family Legal
Support Project at Employment Options
Inc. in Marlborough, Massachusetts. 138
This innovative program works with par-
ents to gain and maintain contact with
their children. The program provides
weekly parenting meetings, supervised
visitation, one-on-one family counseling,
and legal services to mentally ill parents.
The program is part of an array of psy-
chosocial services available to mentally ill
"members" through Marlborough's club-
house. At the clubhouse staff and mem-
bers work together to create an environ-
ment in which members can obtain the
skills and support that they need to man-
age jobs, families, and their recovery. The
project, in addition to giving individual
members legal assistance, educates and
trains the state Department of Mental
Health, the courts, and legal aid providers
on the misconceptions and abilities of par-
ents with mental illness.
Susan was one of the project's
clients. 139 As a result of her divorce, Susan
lost custody of her child. When Susan first
talked with the Clubhouse Family Legal
135 1d. at 1059.
1361d. at 1061.
137 1d. at 1066.
138 For more information on Employment Options Inc., see www.employmentoptions.org.
139 We changed the name of this client to protect her identity and confidentiality.
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Support Project attorney, she just had left
a state hospital after a long psychiatric stay.
Just before Susan's hospitalization, her ex-
husband obtained a protective order,
which prohibited her from contacting her
son. With the help of her attorney, Susan
was granted telephone contact and super-
vised visitation. Over the next eighteen
months, with support from the clubhouse
and her attorney, Susan was able to obtain
unsupervised overnight visitation.
Susan's successes would not have
been possible if she had not been involved
with the Clubhouse Family Legal Support
Project. Through the project she obtained
an attorney, had staff members supervise
her visitation, and received assistance
through weekly parenting meetings. Susan
and her son were able to spend quality
time together as mother and son without
the issue of Susan's mental illness con-
stantly looming in the background.
The success of the Clubhouse Family
Legal Support Project shows that empow-
ering parents with mental illnesses is pos-
sible. The model emphasizes the need to
treat the whole person-assisting people
on basic parenting skills, providing respite
care and support groups, and helping par-
ents obtain legal assistance when neces-
sary.
V. Condusion
Parenting is one of the most rewarding
experiences a person can have, but par-
ents with mental illness sometimes are
denied this experience solely because of
their illness. These parents must prove to
family members, social workers, educa-
tors, lawyers, and judges that they are fit
parents and that they deserve to raise
their own children. Given the obstacles
they face and the complexity and con-
fusing nature of the child welfare and
family court systems, parents with men-
tal illness must have skilled and knowl-
edgeable representation when the issues
of child protection, termination of parent-
al rights, custody, visitation, and the
patient-psychotherapist privilege arise.
When the stakes are as high as losing a
child to another party or the state and
the decision makers already may be
biased against them, parents with mental
illness deserve the best representation
available.
Unquestionably, a stigma is associated
with mental illness. However, the legal sys-
tem must realize that mentally ill parents
still deserve the right to be a part of their
children's lives. As the cases we discuss in
this article illustrate, the law affecting par-
ents with mental illness is not black and
white but gray, and many times this gray
area works against people with mental ill-
ness. Lawyers and judges must be educat-
ed in issues involving mental illness so that
they can provide able representation and
justice for parents with mental illness.
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